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Introduction
• Historically security within organizations was thought 
of as an IT function (web sites/servers, email, 
workstation patching, etc.)
• Threat landscape has evolved (Script Kiddies, Hackers, 
Advanced Persistent Threat (APT), Nation States, etc.)
• Attack surface has expanded – Networks 
interconnected!!
• Some security posture factors
– Network Layer (Routers, Firewalls, etc.)
– Computer Network Defense (IPS/IDS, Sensors, Continuous 
Monitoring, etc.)
– Industrial Control Systems (ICS)
– Software Security (COTS, FOSS, Custom, etc.)
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Custom SW – Gets 
Exploited!
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Threats in Space
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SECURITY THREATS AGAINST SPACE 
MISSIONS
CCSDS 350.1-G-1
March 2015
CCSDS was founded in 1982 by the major space agencies of the world, the CCSDS is a multi-
national forum for the development of communications and data systems standards for 
spaceflight.
Security Threats Against Space 
Missions was developed to provide 
mission planners with an overview on 
threat assessment as well as the 
common threats and threat sources 
that exist for various categories of 
civilian space missions.
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Threats in Space
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Applicable Threats to Space Missions Impacts Could Software Be Involved?
Data Corruption  Modification of information
 System damage
Yes; SW attacks could result in data corruption
Ground Facility Physical Attack Loss of command, control and data No
Interception Loss of sensitive data No
Jamming  Loss of Command telemetry link
 Loss of access to resources
No
Denial-of-Service Loss of access to resources Yes; SW DoS attacks are common and can affect both 
ground, flight and web applications
Masquerade  Potential to disrupt operations 
(uplink)
 Potential to receive false information 
(downlink)
Yes; SW protections can be placed to prevent
Replay System damage (possible safety of life 
issues)
Yes; SW protections can be placed to prevent
Software threats  Undesirable events
 System damage
 Enable other threats
Yes
Unauthorized Access  Disruption of operations
 System damage (possible safety of 
life issues)
Yes; SW protections can be placed to prevent or SW 
can be used to gain unauthorized access
Tainted Hardware Components  Hidden, Malicious capabilities
 System instability
 System damage
 Undesirable System effects
No
• NASA knows that software is one of many vulnerabilities that 
could adversely impact Mission Ops
• Levying requirements from the top (NPRs 2810 , 7150.2B, 
7120.5E, and the SW Assurance Standard/Handbook)
• Software security “defects” are arguably preventable in most 
cases
– During custom code development
• Awareness, Training, Tooling (i.e. SCP)
• Secure Development
• Rigorous SwA (Project and IV&V)
– Software supply chain
• COTS and Open Source (i.e. Origin Analysis)
Reducing the SW Risk
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Secure Coding Portal (SCP) 
Background
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• Recognizing the need to counteract the threat of 
exploitation of custom developed software
• A single touch point for NASA 
developers was established to learn 
how to develop code securely
• Utilizes existing NASA Engineering 
Network (NEN) infrastructure
– Initial deployment is behind NASA firewall
• Partnerships established with experts
– CMU-SEI
– Robert Seacord (Author of CERT C Std.)
– Safari Books Online (custom secure coding tutorial)
• Launched July 20, 2015
– Two Newsletters Distributed (can be shared)
– Custom Secure Coding Tutorial Deployed
– Contact securecodingportal@lists.nasa.gov for additional 
information
• Secure Coding Discussion Forum – providing a friendly environment to 
discuss all aspects of Secure Coding with fellow engineers and experts
• Vulnerability Updates – containing information about the latest software 
vulnerabilities and any insight into what systems, or types of systems, 
could be affected along with how to detect and mitigate these 
vulnerabilities
– Vulnerability Newsletter will also be distributed directly to stakeholders
• Tools – containing information about tools utilized by NASA for security 
analysis of software, including references, available training, and any 
relative insight/lessons learned from NASA practitioners
• Links – containing references to security standards, documentation, and 
information
• Top 25 CWEs – using CWSS to classify Top 25 CWEs for ground and flight
• Tutorial – custom made tutorial by secure coding experts
• Ask an Expert – providing the ability for any community member to 
request assistance from field experts
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Secure Coding Portal 
Content
Secure Development
• Utilize Best Practices from Secure Coding Portal 
– Coding Standards (Ex. CERT C, C++ or JAVA Stds)
– Integrate tools into development environment
• Code Analyzers (i.e. Klockwork, Fortify, Flexelint, CodeSonar, Sonatype, 
BlackDuck, etc.)
• Great resource for identifying tools (Report | Spreadsheet)
– Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE),  Common 
Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE), and Common Attack 
Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) information
– Defense in Depth
– …
• Training
– Secure Coding Tutorial
– Defensive Programming (available online in SATERN)
– Codiscope
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“Herding the Cats”
CWE:
• Serves as a common language 
for describing software security 
weaknesses in architecture, 
design, or code
• Provides a:
– Standard measuring stick for 
software security tools targeting 
these weaknesses
– Common baseline standard for 
weakness identification, 
mitigation, and prevention efforts
• Utilize CWE to better 
understand, identify, fix, and 
prevent weaknesses and 
vulnerabilities
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CAPEC:
• Community-developed list of common attack 
patterns
• Comprehensive schema and classification 
taxonomy
• International in scope
CVE:
• Identifies publicly known information 
security vulnerabilities and assign them a 
CVE_ID. 
• Scored 1 to 10 on CVSS scale
Services sponsored by Department of Homeland Security and managed by Mitre
Taking into account attack pattern and any other factors to generate list of CWEs that are 
critical. Tools report findings in CVEs (known) and CWEs (potential) -> Identify then Fix!
Project SwA – Assuring 
Security
• Currently updating SwA Standard and SwA Handbook
• Educating SwA personnel
– Educate on importance of SW security
– SwA personnel can leverage the same training as developers (i.e. SCP)
• In order to “assure” it, you must understand it!
• Not a clipboard exercise – SwA needs to use tools or ensure tools 
are being used to ensure SW is secure
– Tools have latest security signatures and integrate industry’s best 
practices
– Dynamic & static code analysis as well as binary analysis (i.e. 
identifying CWEs/CVEs)
• Verify and validate project is accounting for security during 
requirements, testing, etc.
– Ex: Security Requirement Traceability Matrix (SRTM), 
Whitebox/Blackbox Testing, Negative Testing, PenTesting, etc.
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IV&V’s Mission
• Perform the “information system and security control 
assessment and monitoring” techniques that NIST attributes to 
the IV&V assessor role in its Risk Management Framework for the 
design, development, implementation, operation, maintenance, 
and disposition of federal information systems.
• Perform Security Analyses throughout the development life-cycle 
per IEEE-1012 Standard for System and Software V&V
• Counteract the threat landscape throughout the system life-cycle
– Ground, Satellite, and Command & Control systems
• IA Techniques deployed throughout project life-cycle phases
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Ensuring Mission and Safety Critical Software and 
Systems Operate Reliably, Safely, and Securely
Origin Analysis
• From Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA)  SOAR Report – “Origin analyzers 
are tools that analyze source code, bytecode, or binary code to determine 
their origins (e.g., pedigree and version).”
• NASA IV&V is beginning to invest in Origin Analysis to reduce the software 
supply chain risk
– Identifies CVEs that may be present in re-used open source libraries/code
– Providing scanning as a service as a part of the Secure Coding Portal –
performed by SCP team
• Tools being used
– Sonatype (auditor version)
– Black Duck HUB 
– OWASP Dependency Check
– Work being performed to automate and consolidate report creation from all 
three tools
14Developers should be using tools BUT IV&V / SwA could also use tools!!
Summary
• NASA starting to make conscious effort to reduce 
the number of vulnerabilities in their missions
– IV&V is now looking at security as a part of mission 
assurance approach
– NASA Procedural Requirements (NPRs) now have 
“security” requirements
– SwA assurance standard security updates are being 
worked
– OCIO Provided Security Training (i.e. Codiscope)
– Secure Coding Portal
– Blue Team Vulnerability Assessment Program (BT-VAP) 
assesses mission survivability to cyber attack
• Custom SW assessments are integral part of approach but is 
accompanied by network exposure (i.e. Threat Pairing) 15
BACKUP SLIDES
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Example SW Impacting 
Mission
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Exploits Custom S/W
Establishes persistent 
foothold on Mission 
Asset 
Mission 
Asset
Signs onto Rogue Wife,
Click Phishing Link, Etc.
Then Signs onto VPN
Can Now Route 
Thru F/W via 
Laptop
Mission
Critical 
Assets
Launch Attacks 
(DoS, Brute Force, 
Extract Data, etc.)
This example will depict how unsecure software within a 
network can potentially impact critical mission assets
Developers can’t assume protection from Firewall. Need 
“Defense in Depth”. Can’t assume if knocking on door, 
that they are supposed to be there.
Sample Exposure
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Demonstrates that a pathway exists from the VPN Landing Zone, Internet, Or Untrusted. Has network 
access to a vulnerability that was identified by software analysis (binary and source).
Vulnerable 
Custom SW
VPN Landing Zone, 
Internet, Or 
“Untrusted”
Sample Exposure
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Demonstrates all outbound access paths (Pivoting) from the vulnerable asset
Vulnerable Asset
Sample Exposure
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Demonstrates potential vulnerabilities that could be exploited from this server
Vulnerable Asset
“Pivot Point”
Mission Critical Asset that 
“wasn’t” network accessible 
from VPN, Untrusted, Etc.
BT-VAP Overview
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• Blue Team Vulnerability Assessment Program (BT-VAP) Defined:
An evaluation to ascertain the operational security posture of an 
agency’s critical mission systems/networks; focusing on the IT assets & 
supporting infrastructures that enable the mission to operate
• Blue Team refers to the tactics and techniques employed: a blue team is 
done in full coordination with the mission elements being assessed in a 
transparent manner with no impact to mission ops
• As BT-VAP evaluates missions “end-to-end”; it is often perceived 
(incorrectly) as duplicative of other assessment type activities:
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BT-VAP Team
• Need for a Blue Team to comprehensively evaluate CS-IA factors in 
a methodical manner results in needing Subject Matter Expertise 
across multiple areas to focus on this specific evaluation
• Use of a “risk jury” with SMEs from multiple disciplines with varying 
perspectives to provide a comprehensive “360o” assessment view 
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ICS/SCADA
/Computer 
Network 
Defense 
Space 
Systems/
Program 
Protection
Security 
Analyst/
Threat  
Protection
Software  
Security/
Cybersecurity
Operations
Network 
Security/
Information 
Assurance
Five Key Role Specialists on this BT-VAP Risk Jury:
We evaluate an organization “top to bottom” (from policy/plans  to operational 
posture)  to examine IF and HOW they address CS-IA risk factors to determine what
their operational security posture is compared to other similar environments 
CS-IA = Cybersecurity - Information Assurance
BT-VAP Testing 
Capabilities
 Cybersecurity Evaluation: determine critical assets, model the “mission thread” 
that these critical assets use to enable the mission – then do a selective “deep 
dive” on potential points of vulnerability based on a test plan &  approved rules of 
engagement to cover:
• Space/Mission Systems (ground)
• Industrial Control Systems/SCADA
• Supporting Infrastructure:  (Layer-2/Layer-3 Network Devices, Controlled 
Interfaces/Firewalls, Cybersecurity Defense (CND) mechanisms, etc)
 Software Security Evaluation:  analyze the software code base which supports 
critical assets and mission threads
• Source Code Analysis 
• Binary/Compiled Code Analysis (S/W Origin Analysis)
 BT-VAP Testing Techniques involve a combination of three principal methods:
• Analytic/Tabletop Analysis
• In the Lab Testing (modeling-simulation environment)
• On-Site with a “flyaway” team with mobile assets 
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We evaluate an organization to examine IF and HOW they address CS-IA risk factors to 
determine what your operational security posture is compared to other similar environments 
CS-IA = Cybersecurity - Information Assurance
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